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Introduction
Youth curfews have been rejected in the academic literature both because they violate
parents’ or young people’s rights (White, 1996, Chen, 1997) and because they are ineffective
as a crime prevention measure (Reynolds et al., 2000, Adams, 2007, Wilson et al., 2016,
Fried, 2001). These arguments have not been influential with policy makers, however, and
the Northbridge youth curfew operated for almost nine years between June 2003 and
February 2012. Curfew contexts and implementation differences complicate comparisons
(Wilson et al., 2016). This article uses a case study to document context and implementation
arrangements and to examine what can be learnt from the Northbridge curfew in Perth,
including how it came about, how it operated, what it achieved, and the reasons for its
demise. The article also analyses the legacy of the Northbridge curfew in terms of discourse
about young people and legitimation of subsequent practices in youth policing that place
blanket restriction on young people.
Overview of curfews
Curfews have a long history and have been applied for various purposes including political
repression (Brass, 2006), to control the use of public spaces by particular sub-populations
(Amsden, 2008, White, 1990), and for public safety (Miller, 2015). Curfews curtail
democratic rights such as freedom of movement and political liberties (Brown, 2000).
Curfews are only justifiable in democratic societies in extreme circumstances when it can be
demonstrated that overriding benefits result from the proposed restrictions of rights (Brass,
2006). Arguments to justify the Northbridge curfew claimed that a curfew would protect
young people from harm, and also protect adults from harms caused by young people
(Cooper et al., 2014). This paper will examine whether these claims can be substantiated in
practice, whether a youth curfew was a proportionate response and whether there were
unintended consequences, beneficial or otherwise. There is insufficient space here to explore
more general questions about parents’ rights vs. state rights (Chen, 1997) or to discuss
questions about youth rights (Brown, 2000) concepts of childhood and maturity (O'Neil,
2002), which, whilst important, are not the focus of this article.
Curfews can be universal, selective, or universal but discriminatory against particular subpopulations. The Northbridge curfew is an example of a selective curfew that is also
discriminatory against various youth sub-populations. Selective curfews apply only to some
sections of the population, for example, youth-based curfews, or some racial groups. In the
United States youth curfews have been more ubiquitous than elsewhere Chen (1997). Chen
contends that youth curfews have been used cyclically as a populist and inexpensive measure
by governments that want to appear to respond to public fear of youth crime and youth
disorder (Chen, 1997). Over the past twenty-five years, youth curfews have been imposed in

several jurisdictions, especially in the USA (Chen, 1997, ‘Youth Curfew Violates EqualProtection Rights’, 2004, Reynolds et al., 2000, Kline, 2012, O'Neil, 2002, Grossman, 2014,
Moscovitz et al., 2000, McDowall et al., 2000).
Other historical examples of selective curfews were the Aboriginal curfews that were once
common across Australian cities and towns. Race-based curfews prevented all Indigenous
people from entering towns, cities or specified places and usually applied after dark (Nugent,
2008, South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council, 2015). In Western Australia, the first
Indigenous curfew was enacted in 1840, eleven years after the British assumed colonial
sovereignty over Western Australia (South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council, 2015).
Aboriginal people had been excluded from Northbridge during the colonial and post-colonial
period. The Aboriginal curfews only finally disappeared across the state when the 1975
Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act made race-based restrictions illegal (Rayner,
2003). Targeted race-based curfews were a legacy of colonial origins and are still found in
some post-colonial countries (Brass, 2006). In Australia, the recency of Aboriginal curfews,
combined with transport links which had made Northbridge a popular Indigenous meeting
area, made the issue of a youth curfew in Northbridge a particular sensitive for Aboriginal
young people and their families.
In a democratic society there is a prima facie expectation that laws should provide equal
protection to all. Selective curfew legislation potentially violates this requirement (White and
Wyn, 2004). In addition, curfews differentially affect particular sections of the population
(Brass, 2006), because of differential material circumstances or habitual patterns of
recreation. The street is a place of recreation for poor and working class young people, who
are also likely to be reliant on public transport (O'Neil, 2002). Curfews that apply only to
pedestrians and those socialising in public space have a substantial impact on poorer
Americans and Australians but little impact upon middle class Americans (or Australians)
who have the ability and preference to pay for leisure activities in private venues, and to use
private transport for night-time travel. In the USA, O'Neil (2002) argues that because poor
and working class people are more likely to be people of colour, curfew legislation is
inherently racist and does not meet the criteria for equal protection because it tends to
criminalise poor and black people disproportionately. The Northbridge curfew also provides
an example of a curfew that has differential effects on different youth sub-populations. The
research reported in this article will assess whether the claim can be substantiated that the
way the curfew applied offers sufficient benefits to young people (and/or others) that
outweighed the restrictions and the indirect consequences of unequal protection.
Finally, breaches of curfews can lead to qualitatively different consequences. Consequences
may include an administrative action (such as welfare intervention), a criminal sanction (such
as prosecution), or an extra-legal response (such as shooting). In the USA, many youth
curfews discussed in the literature have legal consequences for parents or young people, and
they can be taken to court and fined. In Australia and elsewhere (Walsh, 1999) the
consequences are administrative, and a breach of curfew is treated as a welfare issue. Whilst
this may seem more benign, Bessant (2013) (Bessant, 2013) cautions that as part of the

liberal-welfarist tradition, administrative processes were used to enact the forced removal of
Indigenous children from their parents, ‘for their own good’. From a rights perspective, a
disadvantage of administrative processes is that there is often less effective recourse to
challenge administrative decisions. One purpose of this research project was to examine the
sufficiency and appropriateness of the administrative responses as practiced under the
Northbridge curfew.

Research approach
The research presented here was undertaken as part of a larger funded project to evaluate
different approaches to youth night patrols. The research took a case study approach. The
‘case’ or bounded system was the Northbridge Policy Project (NPP), (2003–2012), including
the Northbridge Policy, which provided the legal framework for the project. The research
made use of data from multiple sources as is usual in case study research (Creswell, 2013,
Yin, 2014). The underlying assumption behind this approach is that a case study can enable a
more nuanced and holistic understanding of phenomena (Creswell, 2013). This outcome,
however, depends upon careful cross-comparison of different types of data from multiple
sources and perspectives. This facilitates triangulation, and enables researchers to capture
both complexity and contradictions, and to present different perspectives on how programs
work and their strengths and limitations.
For this project, we conducted interviews with stakeholders who represented organisations
with an interest in the Northbridge Policy. This included policy makers, representatives of
organisations who implemented the Northbridge policy (Northbridge Policy Project partners),
representatives of business groups in Northbridge, and representatives of youth work
organisations that operated in Northbridge but were not part of the Northbridge Policy
Project. We requested interviews with families and young people who had used the
Northbridge Policy Project services, but were told none were willing to participate. We also
analysed quantitative data provided by the Northbridge Policy Project (NPP), by the Public
Transport Authority (PTA) in Western Australia, and police data about reported incidents in
Northbridge from the police research unit in WA. Previous evaluations and other public
documents provided a further source of information. The case study presented here is derived
from a synthesis of this data, which is presented more fully in (Cooper et al., 2014). The
research was approved and overseen by the Edith Cowan University Human Ethics Research
Committee. Data was analysed for the whole period (2003–2012), but the description of the
day-to-day working of the project relates to the period 2010–2012.
The Northbridge Policy
Northbridge is the main night-time entertainment district and a social gathering place for
Indigenous people, including young people. The Northbridge Policy legislation was
implemented in 2003 and restricts children’s and young people’s access to Northbridge in

Perth, Western Australia. A welfare approach would be taken, unless the child or young
person had committed a criminal offence. This meant that no criminal penalty would be
applied to a young person or their family if they were found in breach of the curfew.
The stated purposes of the Northbridge Policy were improved child protection and prevention
of harm; prevention of crime and nuisance by children and young people; and improvement
of the Northbridge precinct. The Northbridge Policy applies to two categories of children and
young people (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b):
Category 1: ‘Children not under the immediate care of a parent or a responsible adult who
are vulnerable by their age in an adult entertainment precinct at night. These are:
•

Primary school age children, that is children 12 years of age and under, in the
Northbridge precinct during the hours of darkness.

•

Young people 13 to 15 years of age in the Northbridge precinct after 10.00 pm.’

Category 2: ‘Children and young people who by their anti-social, offending or health
compromising behaviour are at risk to themselves and to others. These are:
•

Any children or young people misbehaving, engaging in violence, intimidation,
provoking aggression or other offensive behaviours.

•

Any children or young people, visibly affected by or engaging in substance abuse
(e.g. alcohol, cannabis, solvents and other substances).

•

Any children or young people soliciting or begging.’

The Northbridge Policy was intended to apply to ‘children and young people who are
physically or morally vulnerable or engaging in anti-social, offending or health
compromising behaviour’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b) but not to apply to ‘those
children and young people who have legitimate reasons for being in Northbridge, to go to or
from employment, are resident in Northbridge, or are under the immediate care of a parent or
a responsible adult’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b).
The Northbridge Policy and associated Northbridge Policy Project (NPP) were controversial
when first proposed, and were opposed by youth organisations (Koch, 2003), Indigenous
organisations (Carson, 2003), rights organisations (Outcare, n.d., Rayner, 2003) and police
organisations (Armstrong, 2003). By contrast, the legislation was strongly supported in the
print media and had overwhelming public support (MacArthur, 2007).
Factors that shaped the Northbridge Policy
The Northbridge Policy was shaped by both overt and covert concerns. The main overt
concerns were child protection; public nuisance; perceptions of public safety; and concern
about urban decline. The less visible covert purposes of the policy were to improve
collaboration between government departments, especially the police and the department
responsible for child welfare (variously DFCS DCS, DCP), and concern to clarify the child
welfare legislation.

Concerns about child protection arose because of the visible presence of drugs, alcohol, and
street prostitution, (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a) and because large numbers of young
people gathered there. In 2003, between January and March 2003, before the policy was
implemented, the Juvenile Aid Group (the specialist police team responsible for inner city
child welfare) apprehended over 450 children and young people under the provisions of the
Child Welfare Act 1947. This raised concerns that welfare organisations were not acting to
prevent harm. A purpose of the Northbridge Policy was that the NPP should provide
proactive services that would prevent harm to children and young people as well as
responding to immediate risk and protection needs.
Concerns about public nuisance and perceived decline in safety, as well as urban decline in
Northbridge also shaped the policy, especially the provisions under Category 2 of the
legislation. The Busch report (2002) found that Northbridge was perceived by the public and
local businesses to have become more dangerous in recent years. Businesses owners
expressed concerned customers would move to other nearby inner-city entertainment districts
that were perceived to be safer. The Busch report recommended an integrated approach to
crime prevention and community safety to address these concerns, both real and perceived.
Behind the scenes, the Northbridge Policy was shaped by concerns about inter-departmental
collaboration. According to participants, the Northbridge Policy was intended to address
issues raised by the Gordon Inquiry (Gordon et al., 2002). The Gordon Inquiry had strongly
criticised the systemic failure of multiple government departments in Western Australia to
collaborate when working with Indigenous young people and their families. According to one
interviewee an important purpose of the Northbridge Policy was to ensure that the relevant
government departments ‘acknowledge their responsibilities for the long-term welfare of
those children’ (interviewee, government agency) and act appropriately.
The Gordon Inquiry had examined the circumstances surrounding the death of a 15 year old
Aboriginal girl who had committed suicide in 1999. She had previously reported to various
government departments, including police, child protection and the youth justice, that she had
been assaulted and sexual abused. All of these departments had documented serious concerns
for the young woman, including poverty, pregnancy and substance abuse, and nineteen
organisations were involved with the young woman and her family, but no department took a
lead role in coordinating assistance to her or her family. The report concluded that
communications between agencies were poor, and lines of responsibility between agencies
were unclear. The Gordon Inquiry made specific recommendations about how services to
Aboriginal young people and their families could be improved, including through better
government inter-department collaboration and information sharing about child welfare
issues and support. In response to the Gordon Inquiry, the Government released a policy
document (Government of Western Australia, 2002) where they accepted the need for better
communication and coordination when multiple agencies work with the same family, and
accepted that highly mobile young people are especially vulnerable and need better support
services, and the NPP was intended to integrate such services in the inner city. .

A second less visible concern was to clarify the meaning and application of child welfare
legislation. Section 138B of the Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA), required the Police and others
to apprehend children and young people who were ‘at risk of physical and moral danger or
were misbehaving and return them to their usual place of residence’ (Office of Crime
Prevention, 2004). Enforcement of this legislation required judgement about what constituted
physical and moral danger or misbehaviour. The Northbridge Policy was intended to provide
guidance to police on the application this section of the Act in relation to Northbridge (Office
of Crime Prevention, 2006a, Office of Crime Prevention, 2004). The Northbridge Policy
legislation specifically ‘targets children and young people, not under the supervision of a
parent or adult, when there is a risk to their well-being because of the nature of the place
where they are found or the behaviours they are exhibiting’ (Office of Crime Prevention,
2006b). Lack of adult supervision and the nature of the location are explicitly identified as
factors that make a child or young person vulnerable, even when the conduct of the young
person does not contribute to risk. This was subsequently explicitly incorporated into the
amended child welfare legislation in the Children and Community Services Act 2004
(WA)(Government of Western Australia, 2004) under Section 41, which:
‘Authorises a police officer (or authorised officer) to move an unsupervised
child to a safe place, if that officer reasonably believes that there is a “risk to
the well-being of the child because of the nature of the place where the child
is found, the behaviour or vulnerability of the child at that place or any other
circumstance”.’.
The language of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA)(Government of
Western Australia, 2004) aligns with the interpretations of child welfare found in the
Northbridge Policy and the language of child welfare/ protection has changed from ‘physical
and moral danger and misbehaviour’ to a more inclusive, net-widening, concept of ‘risk to
well-being’.
In summary, there were at least six purposes of the legislation and project:
1. Reactive prevention of immediate harm to children and young people found in
Northbridge
2. Proactive prevention of youth harm, youth crime, youth nuisance and disorder, to
supplement reactive intervention by police, and in the long-term, reduce the need for
reactive responses
3. Improvement of government inter-departmental communication and collaboration on
child protection
4. Clarification of the meaning of the Child Welfare Act in the context of Northbridge
5. Reduction of youth crime and nuisance in Northbridge
6. Improvement of perceptions of public safety in Northbridge
The remit of the Northbridge Policy Project was to achieve these purposes.

The Northbridge Policy Project
Prior to the NPP, child welfare in public places had been primarily the responsibility of the
police. This legislation changed the balance of power (and responsibility) between the police
department and the social welfare department. The Northbridge Policy Project (NPP) was
established to implement six purposes of the Northbridge Policy. The project operated from
June 2003 until February 2012. According to NPP records, in the first six months, large
numbers of young people were apprehended, most were Aboriginal (88%) and more girls
(66%) were apprehended than boys; 13% of apprehensions were of children aged 12 years
old or younger; 66% of apprehensions were of young people aged 13–15 years; and 21% of
young people apprehended were aged 16–17 years. After six months, the numbers steadily
declined and have continued to decline (Cooper et al., 2014).
The first evaluation concluded the NPP had been successful (Office of Crime Prevention,
2004) on the basis of reductions in numbers of young people apprehended. A second
evaluation (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006), concluded that the policy had achieved
significant outcomes including improved community confidence, and had reduced the
number of unsupervised young people on the streets of Northbridge late at night. However,
both evaluations mentioned on-going difficulties with inter-agency collaboration, including
concerns about poor communication, different interpretations of the meaning of the
Northbridge policy (especially terms like ‘responsible adult’ and ‘misbehaviour’),
disagreements about which agency was responsible for transporting young people who had
been apprehended, and concerns about transport inefficiencies. The 2006 evaluation also
suggested the geographical boundaries of the project should be reconsidered, the operational
hours should be extended to include Wednesday nights, and that case management processes
should be improved for young people who repeatedly ignored the curfew. Finally the report
recommended that WA Police officers should be permanently assigned to the Juvenile Aid
Group (JAG) team, instead of being rotated according to standard police staffing practices,
which meant frequent staff changes.
A new manager of the NPP was appointed in 2008 and in response to this evaluation,
prioritised inter-agency collaboration, improvement of processes for case management and
efficiencies in transport arrangements. The main inter-agency difficulties arose from
reluctance of the police and social work departments to share information with each other.
Operational difficulties arose if any of the police officers were assigned to other duties, as
sometimes happened. According to one participant, there were also difficulties with social
work follow-up prior to 2007, because social workers from other districts failed to follow up
families of children and young people apprehended in Northbridge.
The manager reviewed the priorities of the project and decided to prioritise Category 1 (child
protection, young people under 16 years old), and to cease giving priority to Category 2
(public order/anti-social behaviour/ crime prevention, young people aged 16–17 years). This
decision meant that staff no longer had to interpret what was meant by ‘misbehaviour’ and
could focus resources on child protection rather than offending or anti-social conduct. In

2008, this was possible because the public order outcomes were perceived to have been
achieved. A consequence of this decision was that the juvenile justice outreach workers
(Killara) had a lesser role in the project.
Northbridge Policy Project partners (2010-2012)
The concept of inter-agency collaboration became central to the NPP (Cooper et al., 2016). In
2010, there were three core agencies, and several other partner agencies. The core agencies
were the Department for Child Protection (DCP), the Western Australia Police (WAPOL)
and Mission Australia.
The DCP had various roles in the project: they provided project management; they referred
some families for on-going mandated social work case management where this was judged
necessary; and, they liaised with the district offices to ensure follow-up occurred. Outreach
Workers managed by the senior social worker patrolled Northbridge on foot, made contact
with children or young people who were subject to the Northbridge Policy. The role of the
outreach workers was to educate young people and divert them away from the more formal
apprehension processes. An emergency social work team, (Crisis Care), assessed all young
people who were apprehended and made decisions about whether it was safe to return the
child or young person to their home. If the home was judged unsafe, Crisis Care found
alternative accommodation, and arranged transport. Crisis Care staff collated all child
protection information about young people who were apprehended.
The Western Australian Police were involved in the project through the Juvenile Aid Group
(JAG). JAG was a special unit within the WA Police formed in 1991 to work with children
and young people, and eventually disbanded in 2013. The rationale for the formation of the
JAG team was to create a specialist team who could collaborate with other agencies to
prevent or delay entry of children and young people into the justice system (Browne, 2000).
The role of JAG within the project was to apprehend children and young people who were in
breach of the curfew, to search them for drugs and weapons, to gain information about
criminal offences, and to check their identity.
Mission Australia, a non-government organisation, had three roles in the project. Firstly, they
provided an alternative to police custody for young people who had been processed by JAG
and Crisis Care and were awaiting transport. If young people did not agree to this, or if they
were arrested for an offence, they were held in police custody. Secondly, Mission Australia
provided voluntary case work support to families of young people apprehended, sometimes in
collaboration with social workers from the Department for Child Protection (Commonwealth
of Australia, 2010, Mission Australia, n.d., Department of Child Protection, 2012)
Thirdly, Mission Australia operated the ‘On-TRACK’ program to provide a preventative
‘brief intervention service’ to young people who had been apprehended under the
Northbridge Policy.
Other NPP partners included the Department of Corrective Services, Killara Youth Justice,
the Nyoongar Patrol Outreach Service, the Public Transport Authority, the Department of

Education Western Australia and the Department of Sport and Recreation (Department of
Child Protection, 2012). The Department of Corrective Services provided a youth crime
prevention and diversion service (Killara). Their role was to provide outreach support
services to young people and their families who have had contact with the police or law, and
sometimes to provide transport home (Department for Corrective Services, 2010). Killara
became less involved in the project post-2008, after the project priorities changed.
The Nyoongar Patrol Outreach Service, a community-based service, was funded to operate an
Indigenous night patrol across the Perth metropolitan area ‘to provide early interventions to
Indigenous people frequenting public spaces in various locations around the city’. The
principle target groups were Indigenous people of all ages, either from Perth or from remote
areas, who were at risk of contact with the criminal justice system because of welfare or other
issues (NPS, 2011). Their role in the project was to provide transport for Indigenous young
people, and to liaise with Indigenous families. The Public Transport Authority (PTA)
operates a security team of Transit Officers who are responsible for security and safety on
Perth trains. The role of the PTA security was to share information with the project and to
facilitate transport of young people by train and bus. The Department of Education (Western
Australia) Attendance Unit was linked to initiatives such as the Student Tracking System and
the ‘Students Whereabouts Unknown’ list and they checked whether young people who were
apprehended in Northbridge are enrolled in school, and whether they attended. The
Department of Sport and Recreation, in conjunction with other organisations, provided
diversionary activities in localities and suburbs outside the city centre to discourage children
and young people from coming to Northbridge.
Influences shaping practices of the Northbridge Policy Project
Several antecedent projects influenced the way the NPP operated. The NPP incorporated
aspects of the Hillarys Youth Project Enquiry (HYPE) outreach model which had been
developed to manage large groups of young people in public spaces. The HYPE model had
been trialled in 1998–1999 as a diversionary response to behaviour by young people that was
perceived as risky or a threat to public order (AIC, 2002, Stirling Council, 2001). In the
HYPE project, the Department of Family and Children’s Services (the social work
department) had been the lead agency and partial funder in partnership with local government
and local businesses (Jarvis, 2003, Stirling Council, 2001). The HYPE project was
established in response to perceived problems similar to those identified in the Northbridge
Policy – large gatherings of several hundred young people aged 12–16 years, under-age
drinking, public order concerns, prostitution for alcohol, and drugs usage by young people
(AIC, 2002, Stirling Council, 2001). The role of the outreach workers was to divert young
people away from actions that might place them at risk, might be deemed anti-social, or
might lead to police intervention (Stirling Council, 2001). The HYPE teams collaborated with
police and security, and if young people did not respond to diversion, police and security
intervened. The HYPE approach had been was transferred from its original location at a
marina entertainment precinct (Jarvis, 2003) to several other locations, especially shopping

malls. The first manager of the NPP previously had a prominent role in the HYPE project
(pers. comm.), and the NPP project adopted key elements of the HYPE model, especially the
management structure and the use of outreach workers to divert large groups of young people
as a first stage intervention.
The Northbridge Policy Project also built upon pre-existing inter-agency collaboration in
Northbridge and the Perth City Centre. A precursor to the Northbridge Policy project was the
Inner City Youth Partnership (ICYP), established in the 1990s, which included JAG, the state
social work department, Crisis Care (the emergency social work team), the education
department, Killara, and non-government service providers, including Nyoongar Patrol
System Inc. and Mission Australia’s On-Track Program (Browne, 2000). This group also
formed links with other services that could provide family support, and drug and alcohol
counselling and crisis accommodation.
How the project operated
There were four main changes brought about by the Northbridge Policy with change the way
the Northbridge Policy Project functioned compared with the precursor projects. Firstly, an
explicit youth curfew was instituted. Secondly, management of the project passed from the
police to the social work department. Thirdly, the social work department took a much
greater role, including the support of an additional outreach team, and active liaison about
case management. Fourthly, the geographical boundaries of the project were explicitly
restricted to Northbridge.
Between 2010 and 2012, the NPP operated three nights per week, on Thursday, Friday and
Saturday nights between 8pm and 2am. On the remaining days the specific provisions of the
Northbridge curfew were not enforced. Project staff from various agencies took different
roles. Before 10pm most staff were involved in outreach and engagement where the aim was
to build rapport with young people, educate them about the Northbridge policy and the
consequences if they ignored the curfew, to encourage positive peer pressure and risk
reduction, and to encourage them to go home. Where necessary, the team provided young
people with transport vouchers to enable them to use public transport to leave Northbridge
before the curfew. If children under 13 years old were found after nightfall without
supervision of a responsible adult, they were apprehended by police and proceeded to Phase
2. After 10pm, young people under 16 years old without a responsible adult might be
apprehended and proceed to Phase 2. In Phase 2, young people were first processed by the
police to check their identity and searched for weapons, drugs or stolen property. After this,
the young person would be assessed by social workers to ascertain their circumstances,
whether they had an existing social work record with the department and to find a safe place
for the young person to be taken. After processing, most young people were held in the
lounge area of the centre, which was staffed by Mission Australia workers, until either their
parents collected them or transport could be arranged to take them home. Most young people
(over 80%), were transported home and no further follow-up was deemed necessary. The
process is summarised in Table 1.

[Insert Table 1 here]

The phases presented in Table 1 reflect changes made during the course of the project. A
manual Young People in Northbridge Policy (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004) outlined
how judgements about risk of harm and offending should be made. According to the manual:
•

Phase 1: Diversion ‘Children and young people considered to be at low risk will be
advised to leave the area.’

•

Phase 2: Apprehension or arrest
o ‘Children and young people considered to be at medium to high risk of
physical or moral danger or who are misbehaving will be assisted from the
streets, assessed and linked to a safe place and to safe people.’ [apprehension]
o Or, ‘Children and young people who are offending will be liable to police
action and dealt with in accordance with prevailing laws.’ [arrest]

•

Phase 3: Follow-up to determine which services needed to engage further with young
people and their families

•

Phase 4: Debrief, agency learning and sharing of perspectives and concerns

Evaluation of the NPP
The evaluation found the NPP was well-resourced and well-organised. Funding was recurrent
and most staff had permanent employment contracts. The project had developed excellent
staff training, support, mentoring and professional development systems, and maintained
comprehensive records of all apprehensions and how they were followed-up. The formal
agreements and informal negotiations between agencies and departments had greatly
improved collaboration between partners.
On the positive side, the achievement of functional inter-departmental collaboration was no
mean feat. The agreements described in the project manual Young People in Northbridge
Policy (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004) clarified responsibilities and processes, and
developed procedures for conflict avoidance and resolution and safeguards for informationsharing. It took nearly three years to gain formal agreement from all departments. These
agreements provided an appropriate response to the recommendations of the Gordon Inquiry.
Although these agreements were made in the context of the Northbridge Policy curfew
legislation, they could have been negotiated on the basis of the Children and Community
Services Act 2004 (WA) under Section 41, which facilitates action to apprehend children and
young people at risk of harm but does not mandate a curfew.
Also positive was the process developed for reactive crisis protection of children and young
people found in Northbridge late at night. The service offered a supportive environment to

children and young people and provided a better alternative to holding children and young
people in police custody pending arrangements for transport home or to a place of safety. The
NPP had effective systems of crisis support for young people under 16 years old who were
found in Northbridge on the nights and hours that the project operated. There were good
systems to check that the young person was returned to a safe place and to find alternative
accommodation when no safe place could be found. The project meant that young people
were not held in police lock-ups, and were held in a youth friendly environment. For young
people under 16 years old who were found in Northbridge, there was good evidence that they
received age-appropriate support and care if they were apprehended. Although this process
was implemented in the context of the Northbridge Policy, it could have been implemented in
the context of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) under Section 41
without the curfew.
Stakeholders interviewed perceived that crime committed by young people in Northbridge
had decreased, and their perceptions were consistent with WA Police crime incident report
data and with NPP data on apprehensions. However, the picture from the crime incident
report data is complicated because young adults have always been more likely than juveniles
to be charged with criminal offences in Northbridge, and because police crime statistics do
not always record minor offences that have been dealt with informally. Stakeholders reported
they perceived that public safety had increased in Northbridge. It is difficult to determine the
effects of the curfew legislation on perceptions of public safety, because there is little
correlation between public perceptions of safety and objective measures of safety (like the
frequency of assaults). In addition, several other changes in Northbridge over the life of the
project, from planning, landscaping and gentrification, to policing, security cameras, and
liquor licencing, have all had potential to change public perceptions of safety. In addition,
this begs the question raised by Amsden (2008) about the legitimacy of achieving
comfortable and sanitised public spaces by excluding people who are not considered suitable
aesthetic. It is however, plausible to accept curfew legislation may have contributed to
perceptions of safety for some people.
We interviewed several participants whose role was to provide proactive programs to parents
and young people through the NNP. All stated that it was very difficult to engage families in
the programs offered, and very few families voluntarily participated. Some stakeholders
claimed family support processes were effective with those who took them up, and this is
reported in a document produced by the project (Department of Child Protection, 2012).
Others were more sceptical and were not convinced of the effectiveness of proactive
programs provided. We did not have access to any data that might corroborate claims of
effectiveness and did not have access to interview anyone who had benefited from these
programs.
In terms of the intended Northbridge Policy purposes, the NPP had potentially contributed to
achievement of four of the six intended policy outcomes. At first sight, this seems like a good
outcome that might potentially justify the curfew arrangements.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Closer inspection, and analysis of how the curfew functioned in practice, presents a less
positive picture. Evidence gathered from the NPP records confirmed that decreasing numbers
of young people were apprehended in Northbridge. Our analysis confirmed that the most
likely explanation for this was that fewer young people were coming to Northbridge on days
the curfew operated. Previous evaluations made the assumption that if young people stopped
coming to Northbridge, they would be in a safer location. Our evaluation questions that
assumption. Based upon analysis of multiple participant interviews, data provided by the
Public Transport Authority, the youth crime data provided by WA Police, and the
demographic changes within NPP data, we concluded the main effect of the curfew was
displacement of significant numbers of young people from Northbridge to other locations. At
the time of data collection in 2011–2012, several participants indicated in interviews that
large numbers of young people, including many Indigenous young people whose family
groups previously came to Northbridge, now gathered in a secluded area near Burswood
station, adjacent to the casino. This displacement was acknowledged by one participant in
this statement.
‘One of the oldest Policeman’s tools in his toolbox was always," if you can’t
solve crime you’ll displace it somewhere else"’ (interviewee, Police).
Some participants believed the alternative location was more risky than Northbridge because
of the lack of support services and lack of surveillance.
The greatest achievement of the project was improvement of inter-departmental (Bessant,
2013)collaboration, which seemed to have made real systemic changes that addressed the
concerns of the Gordon Inquiry and meant that Indigenous young people who were
apprehended were less likely to fall between the cracks. This is something that many
government departments struggle with, and the processes used by this project could be
beneficially applied in other contexts. The other achievement was to create a safety-net for
children and young people in Northbridge and a youth-friendly environment to avoid them
being held in police custody. It should be noted, however, that the curfew was not an
essential element of either of these achievements.
The end of the Northbridge Policy Project
The Northbridge Policy Project ended abruptly and unexpectedly. It came as an
administrative decision announced in mid-2011 and implemented in early 2012. A decision
had been made to outsource the management of the project, as a part of a process to
rationalise the youth programmes funded by DCP, the social work department. This decision
to outsource services formed part of the neo-liberal agenda for new public management.
Tenders were invited for the management of the project, and Mission Australia was

successful. The outreach team managed by DCP was disbanded and the functions of the team
were assumed by Mission Australia.
The legacy of the Northbridge Policy Project
The demise of the project had several consequences. Some participants accurately predicted
the diminution of collaborative between government departments. As one of the interviewees
stated, non-government organisations cannot hold government departments to account and
ensure they fulfil their responsibilities and duties, especially if they rely on the same
departments for funding.
‘An NGO can't say to education, for instance, "Why isn't this kid going to
school? You've got to do something about it." The schools will say, "Well,
keep your nose out of our business," whereas the Department and the
Director-General can get on the phone and say to their counterparts in
education, "This is not good enough. You've got to do something about it.”....
A government agency has got to be pivotal to driving it’ (interviewee,
government employee)
This assessment proved accurate, at least for the period immediately after the transition. The
collaborative agreements, that took three years to ratify, became irrelevant overnight.
Although formal leadership was held by Mission Australia, in terms of power, the police
department resumed its more dominant role, and collaboration declined. For practical
purposes the project shared many similarities with the arrangement that had existed before
the Northbridge Policy.
A legacy of the NPP was the legitimation of curfews for young people, in Perth and in other
parts of Australia. In late 2011, the police commenced Operation Safe Place, a three month
project in the summer of 2011–2012 (Short, 2012). This project replicated some of the
practices of the Northbridge Policy Project but was more restrictive of young people. Key
differences were that the operation was police-led rather than led by the social work
department, and was implemented across the Perth Metropolitan area. No additional
legislation was required because police already had sufficient powers under the Children and
Community Services Act 2004 (WA). Without any additional legislation, police were
empowered to apprehend any young person under 18 years old (not just those under 16 years
old), who was without adult supervision ‘after dark’ (which is about 8pm in summertime in
Perth). That is, it applied to all young people after 8pm anywhere in Perth in contrast to
young people under 16 years old after 10pm in Northbridge under the Northbridge policy.
This constituted a considerable net-widening when compared with the Northbridge policy.
Unlike the implementation of the Northbridge policy, opposition to this ‘administrative
interpretation’ was muted. The implementation of the curfew also had an ongoing legacy in
its influence over policy discussions in Perth where water cannon were proposed (Weber,
2005), in other parts of Australia, for example, the policy statement by Nigel Scullion, federal

minister for Indigenous affairs (Karvelas, 2014, p. 1), in Queensland (The Cairns Post, 2009,
p. 2) also in South Australia.
Discussion
The circumstances that surrounded the policy development of the Northbridge Policy had all
the features of a moral panic, as described by Cohen (1972). According to Cohen, a ‘moral
panic’ is ‘A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a
threat to societal values and interests’ (p. 9). In the first stage of a moral panic, the scale of
supposed problem is exaggerated in the media, so that readers and listeners believe that it is
something that will have an immediate, severe and detrimental effect on their own lives
unless something is done. In relation to the origins of the Northbridge Policy, this is well
documented by MacArthur (2007). A hallmark of the first stage of a social panic is that the
mass media presents particular groups of people in a stylised and stereotypical way.
Individuals are described negatively, and negative stereotypes are recycled to present a “folk
devil” that the public will rally against. Historically, young people have been the targets of
moral panics, and, in Australia, Indigenous people have been recurrent targets of ‘moral
panics’, resulting in legislation that targets and restricts both groups.
Media descriptions of the folk devil reinforce and emphasise the differences between the
objects of the moral panic and ‘ordinary people’. Indigenous young people were presented in
highly stereotypical ways as a threat to everyday life, for example at the time of the
Northbridge Policy a highly publicised incident when a young person stole food from an
al-fresco diner’s plate. The discourse used served political purposes and enabled the
government to appear to be both tough on crime and strong on child protection, both populist
causes (MacArthur, 2007).
Cohen (1972) cautioned there are sometimes long-term effects of a moral panic that can
change social policy and the legal framework, and even change the way that members of
society see themselves. The usual responses to a moral panic are harsher and more repressive
laws, and reductions in freedom and legal protections for the whole population. The
Northbridge Policy provides a good example of this process in action. The Northbridge
Policy was legislated even though it could have been instituted purely administratively
(MacArthur, 2007). The most impressive achievement of the Northbridge Policy Project was
effective coordination of multiple government agencies, but this could have been achieved
without a youth curfew, simply by building upon the previous Inner-City Youth Partnership,
and making the changes to organisation and leadership. If this had occurred, it may also have
been easier to enter into constructive partnership with other youth organisations that were
alienated from the project because of the curfew and the way political debate had demonised
young people.
In the final stage of a moral panic, according to Cohen, the phenomenon either disappears, or
becomes less visible, but continues ‘beneath the radar’; or, worsens and becomes more
visible. In this instance, the phenomena have become less visible in Northbridge, but have

continued ‘beneath the radar’ in other locations. Cohen noted that a moral panic may be
quickly forgotten, or may leave a legacy of repressive policy and legal changes, and that
repressive legal responses may amplify the problem as more people are criminalised and
become alienated, and tolerance is reduced. In this case, the Northbridge Policy left a legacy
of public acceptance of youth curfews and the erroneous belief that they provided an effective
response. Acceptance of these fallacies has led to acceptance of youth policing practices that
places blanket restrictions on young peoples’ activities supposedly ‘for their own good’ and
has contributed to a discourse that infantilises all young people under 18 years old,
irrespective of their individual conduct, maturity and competence.
Conclusion
The case study illustrated some interesting, some surprising, and perhaps some mundane
findings. The legislation brought some benefits. Temporarily, the balance of power and
responsibility between the police department and the social welfare department changed. This
occurred because the NPP was managed by the social welfare department with the police and
others as partners. This change meant that young people detained because of welfare
concerns were no longer held by the police (unless they had committed an arrestable
offence). Briefly, through good leadership, this arrangement also enabled much greater
collaboration between various government departments and non-government organisation.
Less positively, the Northbridge Policy and youth curfew achieved many of its purposes
primarily through displacement of young people to other locations. A major effect of the
curfew was to ‘move the problem’. This outcome disproportionately affected Indigenous
young people. Because these locations were also risky, this did not make young people safer
overall. The coercion inherent in the curfew also undermined the proactive elements of the
NPP, and especially the willingness of families to engage with support services. The
reinterpretation of the Child Welfare Act (1947) by the Northbridge Policy placed the focus
on the nature of the place, and on what other people might do the young person, rather than
the conduct of the young person themselves. From a rights perspective this is a concern
because it represents an attempt to prevent victimisation by restricting the freedoms of the
potential victim, who must modify their activities and conduct. This approach is open to
objection that it places undue responsibility on the potential victim rather than potential
offenders. This line of argument has been resisted in the context of other offences, most
notably rape.
We concluded therefore, that the benefits of the Northbridge curfew did not justify the
restrictions on rights imposed under the policy. Further we concluded that the youth curfew
was an unhelpful and unnecessary component of the Northbridge Policy because the
beneficial outcomes of the NPP could have been achieved without the curfew legislation, and
the curfew inhibited important aspects of the program. Perhaps the most concerning aspect of
the Northbridge Policy is its legacy that has unnecessarily legitimised ineffective and
coercive approaches to concerns about young people’s welfare and youth crime. The media
representation unnecessarily demonised young people, and led to a lasting public acceptance

of even more repressive (and ultimately ineffective) policy approaches to youth crime
prevention and child protection.
The most surprising and paradoxical finding is that the end of the Northbridge Policy project
occurred as a by-product of neo-liberal public management ideology rather than out of
concern for either policy effectiveness, or for young people rights.
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